ABSTRACT To protect collected personal data, current data protection laws and regulations usually request organizations that accumulate and use personal data to adopt reasonable security safeguards. In this case, risk assessment approaches enable organizations to specify security controls as appropriate risks to their personal data. This paper proposes a data-driven risk assessment approach for personal data protection. In the proposed approach, an organization can model flows of collected personal data using extended data flow diagrams. In addition to recognizing scenarios of personal data collection and usage, the organization can identify components used to process, store, and transmit data. Based on associated components for further risk evaluation, the organization can identify potential incidents to each personal data. Compared to a traditional asset-oriented risk assessment approach, the proposed method diminishes risks to assets associated with sensitive personal data. In addition, compared to a process-oriented risk assessment approach, our approach prevents organizations from overlooking risks to sensitive data that are not used in critical business processes. While the proposed approach can improve the risk assessment accuracy of personal data protection, the study may hopefully help organizations adopt more appropriate security safeguards to protect personal data.
I. INTRODUCTION
As information technologies advance, organizations are increasingly able to collect, store, and use personal data for personalized services, advertisements, loyalty programs, and so forth. Although several countries have enacted laws and regulations to request organizations to protect personal data, incidents of personal data leakage are commonplace. According to the statistics of Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) and Open Security Foundation (OSF) [1] , [2] , breaches involving personal data escalate and have recently contributed to the loss of millions of records of personal data. Several countries raise fines for personal data leakage, urging organizations or personal data collectors to protect personal data earnestly. For example, Taiwan finished the amendment to the Personal Information Protection Act in 2010, in which the upper bound of total compensation with regard to an incident increased from 20 million to 200 million New Taiwan dollars [3] . In addition, the EU authorities may fine a company up to 20 million euros or 4% annual global revenue if the company violates the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Several organizations have proposed guidelines, such as BS10012 [4] and NIST SP 800-122 [5] , to help organizations establish personal data protection systems.
Current personal data protection laws and regulations usually follow the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border Flows of Personal Data. In 1995, the Commission of European Parliament passed Directive 95/46/EC requesting EU member states to prohibit organizations in member states from transferring personal data to countries lacking personal data protection laws (or regulations) confirming to the OECD guidelines [6] . If an organization or data collector wishes to accumulate or use personal data of its consumers or data subjects, the organization must obey the following OECD guidelines [7] 1 :
• Collection and limitation -There should be limits to the collection of personal data. Moreover, data should be obtained by lawful and fair means with consent of data subjects.
• Data quality -Collected data should be kept up-to-date, accurate, and complete.
• Purpose specification -Purposes should be specified and disclosed while data are collected.
• Use limitation -The subsequent use of collected data should fulfill the purposes disclosed while data are collected.
• Security safeguards -Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards.
• Openness -The developments, practices, and policies with respect to personal data should be open.
• Individual participation -Data subjects have the right to obtain data about themselves and the right to challenge the accuracy of such data.
• Accountability -The organization is accountable to the data subject in complying with the above principles. In upholding the accountability principle, an organization can assign employees (or the Data Protection Officer) the responsibility of protecting personal data and dealing with data subject complaints. The organization can disclose its practices with personal data and its purpose of use to satisfy the openness principles. Moreover, the organization can follow disclosed practices to satisfy collection and limitation and use limitation principles. In addition, the organization can provide ways for data subjects to access their personal data, ensuring the accuracy and completeness of collected personal data and achieving data quality and individual participation principles. However, when the organization follows the security safeguard principle, the organization may wonder what are ''reasonable'' security safeguards.
In this case, current personal data protection guidelines and best practices, such as BS10012 [4] , NIST SP 800-122 [5] , Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard [8] , and so forth, usually recommend organizations to adopt riskbased approaches that specify security controls as appropriate to risks or potential incidents to their personal data. The GDPR also requests companies to adopt ''appropriate'' security controls based on risks. Generally, organizations establish risk management processes to identity potential personal data incidents, evaluate loss expectancies of potential incidents, and adopt appropriate controls for resolution [9] , [10] . Although the GDPR requests companies to perform Data Privacy Impact Analysis (DPIA) on processing personal data, it focuses on evaluating whether the companies comply with the personal data protection principles rather than security risks of personal data.
To systematically identify and evaluate information security events, current organizations usually adopt an assetoriented approach to assess potential risks. Popular security risk assessment approaches include NIST SP 800-30 [11] , OCTAVE [12] , CRAMM [13] , MAGERIT [14] , Cherdantseva et al. [15] , Fielder et al. [16] , Shin et al. [17] , STPA-SafeSec [18] , Abdo et al. [19] , and so forth. For asset-oriented approaches, an organization typically view its potential incidents as the aggregation of potential incidents to its assets. The organization then evaluates loss expectancies of the incidents based on the characteristics of associated assets, such as the threats, vulnerabilities, and values of the assets. However, if an organization performs risk assessments via the asset-oriented approach, it may find that the assessment results are heavily reliant on the experiences and skills of the evaluator. For example, a person who assesses risks to an asset in an organization may ignore how critical the asset is to a business process. For this reason, research, such as [20] - [22] , propose process-oriented approaches to assess risks to assets, considering whether the assets are involved in critical business processes. However, for personal data protection, even if an organization does not use sensitive personal data in critical business processes, the organization should take care of assets related to the sensitive data and prevent asset risks from being underestimated. For instance, a person who performs risk assessments in an organization should not ignore risks to the tapes that store sensitive personal data.
To address this, our study proposes a data-driven risk assessment approach for personal data protection. People in an organization depict scenarios of collecting and using personal data in the organization with extended data flow diagrams (DFDs). In the diagrams, the organization identifies personal data and components used to store, process, and transfer data. Based on the components, the organization then uses the information to evaluate risks to the personal data. While the proposed approach may prevent organizations from underestimating risks to personal data, the study hopefully helps organizations adopt more appropriate security safeguards to protect personal data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces preliminary knowledge and related work about risk assessment. Section III presents an overview of the proposed approach. Subsequently, Sections IV and V explain the proposed approach in detail. Section VI gives an example about how the proposed approach is used in Taiwan's RFID Applications for Campus Security and Safety Enhancement Project for RFID application providers to perform risk assessments. Section VII offers the main conclusions along with recommendations for future research.
II. RELATED WORK
Information security risk management processes enable organizations to identify potential incidents or risks to, information systems, adopting the most effective means of controlling risks and preventing incidents via [9] : (1) risk assessmentidentifying potential incidents to organizations and evaluating loss expectancies of the incidents; (2) risk treatmentdeciding how to treat potential incidents to organizations; (3) and, monitoring and re-assessing risk -reviewing the effectiveness and applying another iteration of risk assessment if necessary. This study focuses on the risk assessment procedure.
Although organizations may use fault trees [23] , misuse cases [24] , attack trees [25] , and other tools to analyze VOLUME 6, 2018 potential incidents, organizations may have difficulty directly applying these tools to identify and assess incidents. Therefore, current risk assessment schemes generally adopt asset-oriented approaches. According to the requirements of ISO 27001, current asset-oriented risk assessment schemes usually enable organizations to employ the following risk identification steps [26] :
• Identify assets related to the scope of organizational activities.
• Identify threats or potential causes of incidents to assets that may harm the organization.
• Determine the vulnerabilities or weaknesses of the asset that may be exploited by identified threats.
• Estimate loss expectancy when a threat related to an asset exploits an asset vulnerability. Generally, identified assets guide the asset-oriented risk assessment processes in two ways: (1) determining potential incidents to an organization; (2) evaluating expected losses associated with those incidents. First, current asset-oriented risk assessment schemes generally help organizations consider incidents that may occur in relation to its assets and the origin of those incidents. For instance, [27] and [28] list common threats and vulnerabilities related to threats and vulnerability identification. OCTAVE presents a set of generic threat profiles that organizations may use to identify and analyze threats to their assets [12] . CORAS gives an organization a means of visualizing threats to its assets and vulnerabilities of those assets using diagrams [29] .
On the other hand, organizations can use asset information, especially asset value, to reduce risk assessment. For example, when an organization calculates annual loss expectancies (ALEs) for every potential organization incident, it may analyze its single loss expectancies (SLEs) and annualized rate of occurrence (ARO) based on related threats and vulnerabilities [30] . At this point, an organization can assess incidents affecting the same asset together rather than separately. For an asset incident, an organization can simply determine an expected exposure factor (EF), which represents the average proportion of asset values likely to be lost from an incident. The single loss expectancy can be calculated by simply multiplying the asset value and the expected exposure factor. Existing example studies are such as [13] , [27] , [28] , [31] , and [32] which usually use asset value as the major evaluation criterion during risk estimation. In these methods, instead of evaluating loss expectancies of incidents to every organizational asset, organizations can select critical assets based on their value. Nevertheless, this may leave a problem that assessment of risks involves only critical assets [12] .
When people evaluate risks to an asset in an organization, they may underestimate asset risks if they forget that the asset is important to a critical business process. For example, a person may forget that a desktop processes confidential data, overlooking its importance. To reduce the likelihood of ignorance, several researchers have proposed risk assessment schemes that consider the role of an asset in a business process. For example, to determine the value of an asset based on its importance to the business process, Suh and Han proposed an IS methodology for an organization [20] . Khanmohammadi and Houmb [22] proposed that an organization can group its assets by business processes, assessing risks to each business process. Cha et al. proposed an organizational scheme to depict its business processes and assets in flowcharts, marking its assets on flowcharts to represent dependencies among assets and the role of assets in business processes. Therefore, the organization can use the markings to validate the results of asset valuation based on confidentiality, integrity, and availability [21] .
Although an organization assesses risks to assets based on associated business processes, the organization may still overlook risks to an asset in storing and processing sensitive data if the asset is not involved in major business processes. This study focuses on personal data flows in an organization, proposing a risk assessment to an organization based on flows of personal data collected by the organization.
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
As depicted in Figure 1 , the proposed scheme includes the following major steps:
• Identify personal data collected and applicable legal requirements -in assessing risks to personal data collected by an organization, the organization should first identify its personal data. Based on the data, the organization can then identify applicable legal requirements. For instance, Taiwan's Personal Data Protection Law prohibits an organization from collecting and using health-care data, gene data, sexual lives, physical health checkup data, and criminal records without satisfying specific legal requirements [3] . Therefore, an organization should stop keeping such data if it does not satisfy associated legal requirements.
• Identify sources of personal data and parties to share the data -based on identified personal data, organizations should recognize how data are collected. Moreover, organizations should identify situations in which personal data are shared and the parties which receive the data. In addition to using the information to model flows of personal data, organizations may establish privacy FIGURE 1. Major steps of the proposed scheme.
policies and disclose policies to data subjects by obtaining data subject consents. To find details about how organizations establish their privacy policies, interested people may reference [33] .
• Modeling flows of personal data -this study proposes extended DFDs to model flows of personal data. Therefore, an organization can recognize components involved in processing, transmitting, and storing personal data. This study includes details about how to model flows of personal data in Section IV.
• Identify potential incidents to personal data -as described in Section V, to evaluate risks to a personal data in an organization, the organization can identify potential incidents to the data based on assets related to the data in the proposed scheme. Note that if an organization shares personal data with other parties, the organization should consider potential incidents to personal data in the parties.
• Evaluate risks -after identifying potential incidents associated with personal data, an organization applies quantitative or qualitative approaches to evaluate and predict incidents. Consequently, the organization can determine how to treat the potential incidents. Although several risk evaluation approaches have been recently developed, e.g. the research by Vorster and Labuschagne [34] , no single risk evaluation approach fits every situation. Therefore, the proposed scheme does not restrict what risk evaluation approach an organization adopts.
IV. MODELING FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA
This work uses data flow diagrams (DFDs) to show how organizations store, process, and transmit personal data. Although they can use other diagrams to model flows of data, such as sequential diagrams, collaborative diagrams, and flowcharts, DFDs help organizations directly visualize data flows. Figure 2 lists the graphical notations of DFDs in this study.
As traditional DFDs, this study uses rectangles to represent entities, circles to represent processes, arrows to show data flows, and open-ended rectangles to indicate data stores. Because risks to logical data can be covered by risks to FIGURE 2. Major graphical notations used in this study.
associated hardware and software, this study uses gray open-ended rectangles to represent physical data storage. Moreover, this study enhances the data flow model by Howard and Leblanc [35] ; that is, dotted lines are used in DFDs to demarcate the boundaries of different components. To distinguish physical boundaries from logical boundaries, this study uses thin dotted lines to represent logical or system boundaries and thick dotted lines to represent physical boundaries. Finally, small circles indicate interfaces between a user and a system (or between two systems). Data stored in a system can be accessed via system interfaces. Figure 3 offers an example of visualized personal data flows via the proposed scheme. Suppose that an organization provides a website. The website, which is composed of two systems s X and s Y , collects a set of personal data D X from its users. Three processes (PS A , PS B , and PS C ) are involved in processing D X : PS A serves to process the personal data entered by users through the interface I 1 of s X . These personal data are processed by PS A and then stored in local data storage of S X . PS B obtains D X from PS A and replicates D X to an external storage device. PS B also forwards D X to PS C through I 3 to enable administrators of s Y to know the status of current users via the interface I 4 . The organization presents online advertisements of an external online advertisement provider. The provider can obtain D X for personalized advertisements via the interface I 2 of s X . Table 1 presents a glossary of notations in this work. For each DFD, an organization can identify a set of personal data D. Moreover, for each d i ∈ D, the organization identifies the following information:
• A set of systems S d i to collect, process, and store personal data d i . For simplicity, this study views a system as an aggregation of components, such as hardware, software, and so on.
• If a system s j ∈ S d i provides interfaces for other systems or entities to access d i , this study uses I • A set of physical regions L d i that d i are processed. This study assumes systems, media, and entities in a region have similar environmental risks. Therefore, this study only identifies environmental risks for each region l j ∈ L d i .
• A set of entities E d i that may access d i . Figure 4 illustrates how an organization can utilize the DFDs proposed in Section IV to determine potential incidents. This study assumes that these potential incidents can be viewed as an aggregation of the potential incidents to each personal data in the organization. Suppose that an organization collects a set of personal data D. For each d i in D, an organization first identifies potential incidents to associated systems S d i . In this case, several guidelines offer a list of incidents to information systems. For instance, OCTAVE proposes that an organization can consider the following potential incidents: software defects, malicious code, system crashes, and hardware defects [36] . Moreover, while identifying potential incidents to each system s j ∈ S d i , an organization can consider potential incidents to the interfaces used to access d i . Take the security requirements of X.509 certificate technique as an example, an organization should protect the transfer of information from the following potential incidents [37] : identity interception, masquerade, replay, data interception, manipulation, repudiation, and denial of service. In addition to protecting electronic data stored in systems and transmitted via interfaces of the systems, for each physical medium m m containing d i , an organization should identify potential incidents to the medium. Therefore, organizations can establish operating procedures and appropriate countermeasures to protect physical media containing the data from disclosing, modifying, and destroying data.
V. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL INCIDENTS TO PERSONAL DATA
Furthermore, organizations can identify environmental risks to regions that d i are processed. ISO 27005 provides a list of environmental risks, such as fire, water damage, climatic phenomenon, and so on [9] . Organizations can utilize the list with appropriate customization to identify potential incidents to components in each region associated to d i . Similarly, an organization can make use of threats and vulnerabilities to human beings (or entities) provided in ISO 27005 to discover potential incidents to each entity e n ∈ E di . Finally, organizations can obtain potential incidents to each personal data and utilize the identification results for further evaluation.
VI. AN EXAMPLE TO APPLY THE PROPOSED SCHEME IN THE REAL WORLD
To establish standard rules for RFID application on campuses, Taiwan's Ministry of Education (MOE) funded a pilot project at the National Taiwan University of Science and Technology (NTUST). The RFID Applications for Campus Security and Safety Enhancement Project focused on campus security and safety applications in elementary and specialeducation schools. Teams from different universities implemented RFID applications at these schools for the following six scenarios: (a) attendance notification; (b) abnormal body temperature detection; (c) dangerous zone trespass detection; (d) library management; (e) management of equipment and other assets; and (f) guest management.
Privacy is one of the most important issues in this project. First, the project office invited several experts in privacy law, information security, and RFID standards and technologies to establish a consulting team discussing privacy issues associated with RFID applications. Based on suggestions from experts, the project office then developed Personal Data Protection Guidelines for RFID Campus Applications Implementation. Figure 5 illustrates major outputs of the guidelines: First, using the guidelines, RFID application providers develop privacy policies that meet current regulations and best practices for RFID privacy. Moreover, providers can use these policies to communicate with users about how RFID applications collect and use personal data and how these applications protect personal data. On the other hand, the project office requests RFID application providers to perform risk assessment based on guidelines, providing results of risk assessment and risk treatment to the project office. Therefore, the project office can check the results and treatment to ensure that RFID application providers adopt appropriate security safeguards to protect personal data. The risk assessment requirements of the guidelines is listed as follows: Using the means mentioned in Section IV, RFID application providers depict flows of personal data for each scenario and identify personal data and associated components. Figure 6 shows an application scenario for attendance notification. This scenario has three major system components (RFID tags, readers, and the attendance notification system) and two entities (parents of students and teachers). The tag identification process of an RFID reader emits identification requests to monitor nearby RFID tags. When a student's tag receives the identification request, the process retrieves the tag's identity from the local tag repository and sends the identity back to the reader. After receiving the identity, the tag identification process transmits the identity to the attendance logging process in the attendance notification system. The attendance logging process then identifies the student based on the map between student identities and associated tag identities, storing the information in an attendance log. At the start of the first class of the day, a teacher uses the attendancechecking process to yield the attendance status. If a teacher finds a student is missing, he or she requests that the system send a message to the student's parents. The attendance notification process retrieves the relevant contact information and sends this message.
As illustrated in Figure 6 , four types of personal data are collected and used -the identity of a tag, 2 mapping tag identities and student identities, attendance logs, and contact information of students' parents. The application stores personal data in student tags and the attendance notification system. Moreover, the following interfaces transfer personal data among different components -the interface between RFID tags and RFID readers (tag IDs), the interface between RFID readers and the attendance notification systems (tag IDs), the interface between teachers and attendance notification systems (attendance logs and student IDs to notification).
The project office of the RFID Applications for Campus Security and Safety Enhancement further classifies incidents as an RFID application from the above-mentioned parts into the following three classes: (1) incidents to tags -potential incidents to personal data in RFID tags; (2) incidents to systems -potential incidents to personal data stored in backend systems and remote services; (3) incidents to interfaces -potential incidents to personal data transferred among tags, back-end systems, and remote services. Based on classes of incidents listed in Table 2 , the project office supplies a list of incidents suggested for evaluation. For each personal data collected or used by an RFID application provider, an RFID application provider should consider incidents to associated components according to component type. For example, if an RFID application provider stores personal data in user tags, the application provider should evaluate potential incidents of class ''incidents to tags'' for each kind of tag used to store the data. The project office requests RFID application providers to fill out risk evaluation forms to evaluate risk values of potential incidents to personal data based on risk evaluation criteria. Table 3 is an example of a risk evaluation form, listing by data and associated components the incidents to data collected and utilized by an RFID application provider. For each component, the RFID application provider evaluate risk values to the component. The project office further requests RFID application providers to provide information about countermeasures and describe why they are appropriate.
Finally, an RFID application provider should regularly monitor and review residual risks and identify acceptable risks to ensure the accuracy and effectiveness of risk assessment and treatment. Moreover, a provider may need to reassess risks to reflect major application changes. In the RFID Applications for Campus Security and Safety Enhancement Project, the project office requests that RFID application providers maintain risk management processes and associated application records. To ensure the effectiveness of risk management processes, the project office reviews data periodically. We have implemented the proposed risk assessment scheme as C#.net WinForm application with Visual Studio 2017. Figure 7 presents a snapshot of our project implementation in which a security assessment process is demonstrated. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This study proposes a data-driven risk assessment approach to personal data protection in which an organization models collected personal data flows using DFDs. In addition to recognizing scenarios of personal data collection and usage, the organization identifies components used to process, store, and transmit personal data. Based on associated components, the organization can identify potential incidents to each personal data. Compared to the traditional asset-oriented risk assessment approaches, the proposed approach prevents risks to assets associated with sensitive personal data from being underestimated. In addition, compared to the processoriented risk assessment approaches, the proposed approach prevents the overlooking of risks to sensitive data not used in an organization's critical business processes. Therefore, the proposed approach improves the accuracy of risk assessment for personal data protection.
Our future work includes the following directions. First, future tools may help a person draw DFDs based on our approach and management of diagrams. Additionally, the tools can automatically identify personal data and associated components, generating potential incidents to the data for risk assessment. Moreover, the tools can store risk assessment results and further treatment into database. Therefore, the organization can review the effectiveness of previous risk assessment and treatment.
Second, this study classifies components associated to personal data into systems, entities, interfaces, media, and physical regions. The components can be further classified into sub-components, e.g., media such as documents, tapes, USB disks, and so on. In addition, research may provide sample incidents to different kinds of components and subcomponents.
Last but not least, this study does not address personal data quantity. For example, the value of front-end systems for users to input their personal data differs from the database system storing all personal data. Representing personal data quantity in DFDs and using the information for risk assessment remains important and exciting future work. VOLUME 6, 2018 
